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Abstract
Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an excellent introduction to 
philosophical work on emotions and a novel defence of their own At-
titudinal Theory. After summarising their discussion of the literature 
I describe and evaluate their positive view. I challenge their theory on 
three fronts: their claim that emotions are a form of bodily awareness, 
their account of what makes an emotion correct, and their account of 
what justifies an emotion.
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1
Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is both an introduction and an 
original contribution in its own right. Presupposing no knowledge of 
philosophical work on the emotions, the book guides us through the 
central theories, discussing familiar issues and offering novel critical 
evaluation in equal measure. The book is a pleasure to read and is 
an ideal work to use in a postgraduate or final year undergraduate 
course on emotion. Indeed, I have used it in just this way twice. At 
the book’s core, however, is an original theory of emotion, the “At-
titudinal Theory”. Whilst this account, and the book more generally, 
stands firmly within the philosophy of mind, the significant atten-
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tion devoted to the relation between emotion and evaluation (and 
value itself) ensure that it will be of interest to those concerned with 
normative issues and the nature of our engagement with them. This 
neatly reflects the fact that one of the things that makes the philoso-
phy of emotion such a fascinating area is that it stands at the inter-
section of the philosophy of mind and ethics. The emotions are that 
part of our psychological life through which we are most personally 
engaged with value, with what matters to us. It is a virtue of Deonna 
and Teroni’s fantastic book that it paints such a vivid and recognis-
able picture of the nature and significance of this engagement.
In what follows I first outline a few of the book’s central themes 
and arguments, subsequently turning to the Attitudinal Theory, 
Deonna and Teroni’s positive account of emotion, subjecting it to a 
somewhat more detailed scrutiny. As will be seen, there are a num-
ber of objections that can be raised.
2
Emotions, Deonna and Teroni tell us in their opening chapter, are 
intentionally directed, phenomenal episodes that are to be distin-
guished from emotional dispositions (and sentiments, moods and 
character traits); and are evaluated for correctness, justification and 
propriety. A word about some of these is in order.
Intentionality. Since, when I am angry, I am angry at some-
thing or with someone, my anger exhibits intentionality. And as it 
is with anger, so it is with other emotions. We can then agree that 
emotions have content, or are meaningful. This is not to say that 
emotions have propositional content, although it does not rule it out, 
but simply to insist that they are directed toward things, their “par-
ticular objects”. This, however, is not the end of the matter. For, as 
Deonna and Teroni tell us in Chapter 4, emotions possess “formal 
objects” (Kenny 1963: Chapter 9). These are evaluative properties 
that serve, amongst other things, to individuate the emotions. Thus 
by Deonna and Teroni’s reckoning, fear is, in some way yet to be 
determined, associated with something’s threatening me; anger with 
its offending me; shame with its degrading me; and so on. The most 
natural thought in this area, but hardly yet a theory, is that fearing 
a involves taking a to be threatening, being angry with a involves 
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taking a to be offensive, and so on. Thus, the emotion ascribes the 
formal object to the particular object.
Phenomenality. There is, as philosophers are keen to say, some-
thing it is like to have an emotion. Joy, fear, resentment and pride 
feel a certain way. As such, they are episodic rather than dispositional 
phenomena. Conscious psychological episodes are the sorts of thing 
that populate the stream of consciousness. They include thoughts, 
imaginings, sensations, urges, judgements and, according to Deonna 
and Teroni, emotions. Psychological dispositions, on the other hand, 
are not themselves phenomenal but rather help to determine which 
conscious episodes one enjoys. So characterised, we might include 
beliefs, desires, sentiments and emotional dispositions among their 
number. A belief is itself not a phenomenal state but a person that 
believes that P is thereby disposed to judge that P in suitable cir-
cumstances. To see the distinction between emotional episodes and 
emotional dispositions, consider that I may for some time have been 
horrified by Dr. Frankenstein’s creation but only upon seeing the 
creature feel fear.
Evaluation. Emotions can be correct or incorrect, justified or 
unjustified, appropriate or inappropriate. If I fear a harmless spider, 
my emotion is incorrect. Nevertheless, if the creature looks just like 
a dangerous one, my fear may still be justified. If I become angry 
with someone who has offended me, my emotion is correct. It may 
be, however, that my anger is the result of my bad mood, a factor 
that Deonna and Teroni take to undermine the possibility of its being 
justified. So correctness and justification are doubly dissociable. In 
addition, we also evaluate emotions for various sorts of appropriate-
ness. Confronted by a pack of wolves, fear may be the least (pruden-
tially) appropriate response despite, indeed because of, the threat 
they pose. Finding amusement at another’s intense embarrassment 
may be (morally) inappropriate, no matter how funny their faux pas.
3
After briefly defending the coherence of the concept of emotion 
from recent scepticism (Chapter 2)1, Deonna and Teroni go on reject 
1 Unaccompanied chapter and page references are to Deonna and Teroni 
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a number of views that attempt to reduce emotions to other, pre-
sumably better understood, psychological phenomena. For example, 
they reject the views that emotions are: beliefs or judgements about 
the non-evaluative features of their particular objects (Chapter 3); 
judgements about the evaluative features of their particular objects 
(Chapter 5)2; combinations of such judgements with desires (Chapter 
3); judgements about the satisfaction status of one’s desires (Chapter 
3); perceptions of one’s own body (Chapter 6); and either direct or 
indirect (quasi-) perceptions of the evaluative features of their par-
ticular objects (Chapter 6).
This is quite a list, representing in broad outline the central views 
of emotion currently on the market. Deonna and Teroni do a fantas-
tic job of presenting and evaluating these views, judiciously assessing 
both their merits and their faults (and along the way even offering a 
brief defence of realism about value (Chapter 4)). Whilst it strikes 
me that not every one of their arguments will, ultimately, with-
stand sustained critical scrutiny, at the very minimum they show 
that each one of the dominant approaches to emotion comes with 
costs and owes answers to some difficult questions. I very briefly 
mention some of these here before moving onto focus on Deonna 
and Teroni’s positive proposals concerning the nature of emotions, 
their connection to value, and the ways in which we evaluate them 
(Chapters 7-10).
Emotions are not, and do not constitutively depend on, judge-
ments. The view that they are (or do), associated with the Stoics and, 
more recently, Solomon 2007, Lazarus 1994, and Nussbaum 2001, 
falls foul of a number of difficulties. The view that emotions are non-
evaluative judgements can be seen to be inadequate when we note 
that, for any candidate judgement, it may accompany wildly differing 
emotions in different individuals (29). For example, the judgement 
2012 throughout.
2 Deonna and Teroni (39, note 1) use ‘belief’ and ‘judgement’ as interchange-
able. Since their primary concern is with emotion, which they construe as an 
episode, ‘judgement’ is surely the appropriate term. Without wishing to prejudge 
the issue of whether emotions are episodes or states, I will use ‘judgement’ when 
discussing accounts of episodic phenomena and ‘belief’ when discussing accounts 
of the non-episodic.
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that I have won a game of tiddlywinks may mean joy for me, but 
misery for my opponent.
The view that emotions are evaluative judgements might initially 
seem to fare better; after all, as suggested above, emotions seem to 
be constitutively connected to certain values, their formal objects. 
Unfortunately for this view, argue Deonna and Teroni, evaluative 
judgements are not sufficient for emotions (55). It is perfectly com-
monplace to judge a situation dangerous, yet feel no fear. One might 
suppose that moving to a mixed theory would help here. Perhaps 
emotions are complex states; combinations of judgements and de-
sires. For example, we might suppose fear to be a complex state of 
judging something to be a threat whilst desiring to avoid it. Such a 
position seems attractive in that, according to it, emotions have a 
cognitive element, and are thereby evaluable as correct, and a co-
native element, thereby being intrinsically motivating. Once more, 
however, the view can be seen to be inadequate once we notice that 
judgements are not necessary for emotions. On a glass skywalk, one 
may experience fear without any temptation to judge the situation 
dangerous or threatening. Arguably, furthermore, to feel fear one 
need not even posses the concept danger, unless we are to deny that 
conceptually unsophisticated subjects such as infants and non-human 
animals can experience the emotion (55).
What of the view that emotion can be understood on the model 
of perceptual experience? Such a view, one might think, is on the 
right track, since we think of perceptual states as non-conceptual 
(so shared with conceptually unsophisticated subjects), directed at 
objects (so intentional) and essentially conscious (so felt).3 But we 
can ask what are the objects of such emotional perceptions. On one 
view, seemingly endorsed by William James (1884), the object of 
an emotional state is one’s own body. An emotion is the perception 
(from the inside) of the bodily changes caused in one by some per-
ceived object. Whether or not this was really James’ view, one of 
the familiar objections to it is that it does not really tell us what is 
distinctive about emotion per se (65). There are many situations in 
which one perceives a bodily change, but is not in an emotional state. 
3 Putting aside the supposed cases of non-conscious perception found in blind-
sight and masked priming.
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What then is it that all the emotional perceptions of bodily changes 
have in common? We are none the wiser.
Perhaps a more intuitive thought is that emotions are (analogous 
to) evaluative perceptions of outer objects (de Sousa 1987). Thus, fear 
is the perception of some object as threatening; anger the perception 
of some object as offensive, etc. The central problem with this view, 
as Deonna and Teroni see it, is that an emotion, unlike a percep-
tual experience, depends on a ‘cognitive base’ (5) that, when things 
go well, provides a justificatory reason for it (Chapter 8). Thus, my 
feeling angry at Bert depends on my having some awareness of Bert 
that, if my anger is justified, presents him as in some way deserving 
of my anger. This is brought out by the fact that we ask, and demand 
answers to, ‘Why?’ questions directed at the emotions. If I am angry 
with Bert, it is legitimate to ask why. If I am unable to provide an 
answer, my anger will appear unjustified. In this regard, emotion is 
like belief and, perhaps to a lesser extent, desire. We demand that 
people be able to say why they believe that P; we are somewhat less 
strict with desire. Perceptual states, like states of knowing, do not 
admit of such questions. To ask why I know or perceive something is 
to express confusion. Insofar as such questions make sense, they ask 
not for reasons but for causal explanations. Such is the case with per-
ceptual experience. Thus, if asked why I am currently experiencing a 
ringing sound, I may answer that my alarm is sounding, or that I have 
been listening to loud music. But neither of these answers justifies my 
experiencing a ringing sound. They explain it. On the other hand, if 
asked why I am afraid of the spider, I may reply that it is poisonous. 
This places my fear within the realm of reasons, staking for it a claim 
to justification. This disanalogy with perceptual experience is suf-
ficient to cast serious doubt on the perceptual account of emotional 
feeling, the rejection of which paves the way for Deonna and Teroni’s 
own “Attitudinal Theory”.
4
The Attitudinal Theory combines two key claims: (AT1) Evaluation 
is an element of the attitude, not the content, of an emotion; (AT2) 
Emotions are constitutively tied to states of bodily “action readiness”. 
These two claims provide the material for Deonna and Teroni’s pro-
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posed account of emotional correctness. In summary,
each emotion consists in a specific felt bodily stance towards objects 
or situations, which is correct or incorrect as a function of whether 
or not these objects and situations exemplify the relevant evaluative 
property (89)
This, taken together with the account of emotional justification pre-
sented in Chapter 8, constitutes the heart of the book’s positive pro-
posal concerning the nature of emotion.
To see what Deonna and Teroni have in mind with their claim 
that evaluation is an element of the attitude of emotion consider the 
case of belief (76-7). In believing that grass is green, I hold an at-
titude toward the content grass is green. That attitude might be char-
acterised as considering true. It is because I hold the considering true 
attitude to the proposition that grass is green that my belief is cor-
rect if and only if it is true that grass is green. Truth is an element 
of the attitude of belief not, or not usually, its content. That is, we 
do not suppose that the content of the above belief is grass is green is 
true. Now, consider the case of emotion. A number of contemporary 
views place evaluative concepts in the emotion’s content. Thus, grief 
is the judgement that someone or thing is a great loss, fear is the per-
ception of something or someone as a threat, and so on.
This, argue Deonna and Teroni is a mistake. Just as truth, which 
they claim to be the formal object of belief, is not thereby an element 
of the content of belief, and the good, arguably the formal object 
of desire, is not thereby an element of the content of desire, so we 
should agree that the evaluative properties that are the formal objects 
of the various emotions are not thereby elements of the contents of 
emotion. Rather, we need to think of these evaluative properties as 
elements of the attitude one holds toward the content of an emotion.
This move, one of the more interesting innovations in the book, 
requires us to elaborate on the nature of emotional attitudes. If belief 
is considering true, what are emotional attitudes? It is at this point that 
Deonna and Teroni bring in the notion of felt bodily action readi-
ness. Deonna and Teroni start from the idea that the phenomenology 
of the emotions is, at least primarily, bodily phenomenology and that 
there is a constitutive link between their phenomenology and their 
intentionality. The core of their position is that, “we should conceive 
of emotions as distinct types of bodily awareness, where the sub-
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ject experiences her body holistically as taking an attitude towards 
a certain object” (79). What it is for one’s body to take an attitude 
towards an object is further elaborated by way of Frijda’s 2007 no-
tion of action readiness. We experience our body as poised to act in 
various ways with respect to some object. So, for example, in fear 
we experience our body as ready to “contribute to the neutralisa-
tion of what provokes the fear”; in anger we experience our body 
as, “prepared for active hostility”, towards an object; in sadness, we 
experience our body as “prevented from entering into interaction” 
(80) with the object; and so on. This relates emotions to evaluative 
properties, their formal objects, in the following way: each of these 
attitudes is correct if and only if the object in question has the rel-
evant property. It is correct to neutralise something if and only if it is 
a threat, it is correct to prepare for hostility toward something if and 
only if it is offensive, the formal objects of fear and anger respectively.
With this, we see how Deonna and Teroni combine their view of 
emotional evaluation as an element of the attitude with their account 
of bodily action readiness to derive an account of the correctness 
conditions of emotional states. To complete the picture, however, 
they also offer us an account of emotional justification. Given that, 
on Deonna and Teroni’s view, emotions rest on a cognitive base, a 
natural view of justification would be that an emotion is justified if 
its cognitive base represents its object as possessing its formal object. 
So, for example, an experience of fear would be justified if it rests on 
a judgement, perception, etc. of that object as threatening. As I un-
derstand them, Deonna and Teroni accept that this natural thought 
may capture a sufficient condition of emotional justification, but they 
deny that it is necessary. As they put it,
[t]he cognitive base of an emotion then need not, and typically does 
not, contain an evaluative judgment or a value intuition. This is for 
instance the case when fear is explained by the subject’s awareness of a 
dog with big teeth behaving erratically (96)
To find a necessary condition, we must loosen the requirement, al-
lowing the cognitive base to represent the particular object as pos-
sessing some property that, in the context, constitutes an instance of 
the relevant evaluative property that figures in the emotion’s cor-
rectness conditions (97). In the above example, the dog’s having big 
teeth and behaving erratically constitutes it’s being a threat. As such, 
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fear is a justified response. Of course, I may have misjudged, or mis-
perceived, the dog’s behaviour. Perhaps it is not really a threat. In 
which case my emotion is justified but not correct.
5
Any view, such as Deonna and Teroni’s Attitudinal Theory, that 
treats emotions as constitutively tied to bodily awareness (felt bodily 
action readiness) must be able to explain the fact that there seem-
ingly exist subjects who lead a rich emotional life despite lacking the 
relevant bodily perception and active capacities (Cobos et al. 2002; 
cf. Cole 1995). This is a challenge that goes as far back as Cannon’s 
1927 challenge to James’ account of emotion as a form of bodily 
awareness and recent defenders of neo-Jamesian views have an an-
swer to hand (Damasio 2006; Prinz 2004). According to this view, 
emotional feeling may involve what Damasio terms an “as if loop”, 
a neural surrogate for the relevant bodily states that, “help[s] us feel 
‘as if’ we were having an emotional state” (Damasio 2006: 155). 
Whilst Damasio speaks of feeling “as if ” one has an emotion, Prinz 
makes the stronger claim that despite its bodily character, emotion 
can exist in the absence of the relevant bodily changes (Prinz 2004: 
57, 72) and, in this judgement Deonna and Teroni concur, claiming 
that, on the Jamesian view, “[a]n emotion would then either consist 
in the veridical perception of certain bodily changes or, when such 
changes are not present, in the simulation of such perception” (65).
Given that Deonna and Teroni’s view is one according to which 
emotions are a form of bodily awareness, and given that they men-
tion no other response to this objection to bodily views, we can as-
sume that the postulation of an “as if ” loop is a part of their defence 
of their Attitudinal Theory. But it is far from clear that this is some-
thing to which they can simply help themselves. As we have seen, 
Deonna and Teroni take emotions to be conscious episodes, in their 
terms that they are “essentially felt” (18), with any putative cases of 
unconscious emotions being explained away as merely unattended, 
mis- or non-conceptualised, or merely dispositional (16-7). It is cru-
cial to note, however, that the “feelings” of which Damasio speaks 
are not themselves conscious states. Damasio explicitly distinguishes 
between,
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a state of emotion, which can be triggered and executed nonconsciously; 
a state of feeling, which can be represented nonconsciously; and a state of 
feeling made conscious, i.e. known to the organism having both emotion 
and feeling (Damasio 2000: 37)4
At a first glance, then, one might suppose that Deonna and Teroni 
may not help themselves to the “as if ” loop response, which appar-
ently involves only non-conscious “feelings” and not conscious, es-
sentially felt emotions. On reflection, however, perhaps the problem 
is not with Deonna and Teroni’s use of the “as if ” loop response, but 
with the response itself. For the putative counterexamples to bodily 
accounts of emotion are precisely cases of conscious emotion without 
bodily phenomenology, so it is far from obvious how a non-conscious 
state will play the role assigned to it.
There is some reason to suppose, then, that we must reject one of 
the following, (i) Conscious emotions can persist in patients without 
any bodily feeling, veridical or otherwise, (ii) Emotional phenom-
enology is bodily phenomenology. Deonna and Teroni apparently ac-
cept both and offer no way of resolving the tension. Admittedly, they 
do point out that the Attitudinal Theory can be divorced from the 
particular Jamesian interpretation that they give it (81). That is, one 
might accept AT1 whilst rejecting AT2. However, they themselves 
do not favour such an approach and it is remains an open question 
how one would characterise such evaluative attitudes in a non-bodily 
way. Nevertheless, the above worry about the viability of Jamesian 
views in general may push the Attitudinal Theory in that direction.
6
Setting the above worries aside, we can ask about the plausibility of 
the account of correctness. Here is Deonna and Teroni’s account of 
correctness for fear,
Fear of the dog is an experience of the dog as dangerous, precisely be-
cause it consists in feeling the body’s readiness to act so as to diminish 
the dog’s likely impact on it (flight, preemptive attack, etc.), and this 
felt attitude is correct if and only if the dog is dangerous. (81)
4 Likewise, Prinz (2004: Chapter 9) is happy to speak of unconscious emo-
tions.
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This is a natural thought. Surely it is correct to run, etc. from an ob-
ject if an only if it is threatening. But the naturalness of this thought 
masks a difficult question: what does ‘correct’ mean in this quota-
tion? ‘Correct’ in this context cannot mean ‘true’, since running 
is not truth-evaluable. But in what sense is running from a threat 
correct?
The difficulty in providing an answer to this question is perhaps 
more obvious when we turn to some of Deonna and Teroni’s other 
examples. Anger, they tell us, “is an experience of [someone] as of-
fensive, precisely because it consists in feeling the body’s readiness to 
act so as to retaliate one way or another, and this felt attitude is cor-
rect if and only if the person is or has been offensive.” (81). Really? 
Jesus taught his followers that, “if anyone strikes you on the right 
cheek, turn the other also” (Matthew 5:39). Christians, it seems, 
would reject the thought that retaliation is the correct response to 
offense. Or consider the case of shame. This, say Deonna and Ter-
oni, is, “the experience of oneself as degraded, precisely because it 
consists in feeling one’s body ready to act so as to disappear into the 
ground or perhaps from the view of others, and this felt attitude is 
correct if and only if the person is degraded” (81). What is correct-
ness here?
To the question of what correctness amounts to in Deonna and 
Teroni’s account of fear, it is natural to answer “rational”. Indeed, 
plausibly, it is rational to flee if one spies a threat and irrational oth-
erwise. But such an answer is markedly less plausible in the other 
cases. Is it rational to prepare for retaliation when offended? It is far 
from obvious that it is. Is it rational to disappear into the ground 
when degraded? I am tempted to say that, insofar as I can make sense 
of the suggestion, it is not. More significant than such puzzlement, 
however, is the suspicion that correctness in these analyses is ulti-
mately a matter of prudential or moral appropriateness. But these 
notions, so Deonna and Teroni suppose (7), are to be contrasted 
with correctness, as the earlier example of feeling (correct but pru-
dentially inappropriate) fear at a pack of wolves was intended to il-
lustrate. Without a further characterisation of the sense in which 
correctness is being employed in these analyses, it would seem that 
the Attitudinal Theory may fall into the trap of conflating it with 
appropriateness.
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7
My final critical comment on the Attitudinal Theory concerns the 
account of justification. Deonna and Teroni spell their account out 
in the following way,
An emotion is justified if, and only if, in the situation in which the 
subject finds herself, the properties she is (or seems to be) aware of and 
on which her emotion is based constitute (or would constitute) an ex-
emplification of the evaluative property that features in the correctness 
conditions of the emotion she undergoes. (97)5
I put to one side the worry that the notion of constitution (really 
an ‘in virtue of’ relation) employed here is less than transparent, 
especially regarding the issue of how we are to properly distinguish 
between the constituting properties and the “situation” (which De-
onna and Teroni admit is required for even a supervenience claim to 
hold (96-7)). Instead, I focus on an objection that they pose to their 
own view but then, curiously to my mind, seemingly misinterpret 
in their response (98ff). As they put the objection, “[t]here seems 
to be an important gap between awareness of properties constituting 
an instance of an evaluative property and what justifies a given emo-
tion.” (98). The most powerful way of stating this objection, it seems 
to me, is that justification travels via content, so the non-evaluative 
content of the cognitive base (that the dog has big teeth) cannot jus-
tify the evaluative attitude that is the emotion (that it is dangerous). 
According to this principle, a representation of something as an F 
cannot not justify one’s taking it to be a G in the absence of some fur-
ther information (say that all Fs are Gs). This, it might be maintained, 
5 As it stands this condition may seem inappropriately insensitive to informa-
tion possessed by the subject that undermines the credibility of the cognitive 
base. For example, if I falsely take the fierce dog to be safely chained to a wall, I 
would not be justified in fearing it. Or, at least, such a belief would surely affect 
the extent to which my fear was justified. Deonna and Teroni’s account of justifi-
cation is entirely “bottom-up”, with justification flowing from the cognitive base 
alone, but there is surely some pressure to recognise top-down effects on justifi-
cation; effects stemming from beliefs etc. that are relevant to the case, without 
themselves forming a part of the cognitive base. Since Deonna and Teroni do 
accept that justification can depend on the subject’s beliefs (99-100), it seems 
reasonable that some such account of how justification can be defeated may be 
incorporated into their account.
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holds in cases where Fness constitutes Gness. It even holds in cases 
where Fness is identical to Gness, as the example of temperature and 
mean kinetic energy shows. Given this, we should be highly sceptical of 
the idea that being aware of something as having big teeth, even in a 
context in which this property constitutes being a threat, is sufficient 
to justify one’s taking it to be a threat. Deonna and Teroni owe us an 
explanation of exactly where this line of thought goes wrong.6
8
Deonna and Teroni’s The Emotions is an exemplary introduction to 
the philosophy of emotion. It skilfully leads the reader through the 
thicket of contemporary philosophical work on emotion in a way 
that is at once introductory and challenging. This is an impressive 
achievement. But it is also itself a significant contribution to that 
body of philosophical work. The Attitudinal Theory of emotion, de-
fended in this book, is a serious contender to be ranked alongside 
other major theories currently available. There are, as I have tried 
to suggest above, some unanswered objections to which Deonna and 
Teroni owe responses. But a good book, especially an advanced in-
troduction of this sort, should leave us with at least as many ques-
tions as it answers. In that way it inspires its students to dive into 
the issues themselves. This is precisely what Deonna and Teroni do. 
Theirs is an introduction that shows students in a methodical way 
exactly how to pursue careful, systematic and wide-ranging thinking 
about a difficult and absorbing topic.7
6 Note that this argument does not assume that in order for one’s emotion to 
be justified one must be aware, from the first-person perspective, of that which 
justifies it, or that one must take one’s emotion to be appropriate (cf. the account 
discussed by Deonna and Teroni on pp. 100-1). Rather, it assumes merely that for 
an emotion, or any other state, to be justified, one must be in states (accessible 
or otherwise) with the right justifying content, and that this is individuated at the 
level of sense, not reference. Some externalists will deny even this. My point is 
simply to press Deonna and Teroni for some further illumination regarding ex-
actly what the moving parts of their theory of justification might be.
7 Thanks to the students in my Evaluating Emotions seminars 2011-14; to Julien 
Deonna, Fabrice Teroni and Ann Whittle for preventing me from making too 
many mistakes; and to Moritz Müller for many hours of conversation on emo-
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